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1 Abstract
The flooding of New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina resulted in a massive and rapid
exodus of individuals from New Orleans to locations around the United States. In the
midst of the hurricane recovery, the City of New Orleans reelected Mayor Ray Nagin to
a second term in office. Arguments regarding when this election would be held were
largely driven by views regarding the impact of the diaspora on the voting population in
New Orleans. With more than half of the city’s population gone, the unknown was who
would be able to vote. We use voting record data from twenty election cycles, GIS-coded
flood depth data, and census data to examine the voting behavior of registered voters in
New Orleans before and after Hurricane Katrina. We apply a variety of statistical tech-
niques, including propensity score matching methods, to compare the mayoral turnout
of registered voters across flood depths. We find that registered voters who experienced
more than six feet of flooding were more likely to participate in the mayoral election than
registered voters who experienced less flooding. We attribute this to their increased moti-
vation to participate in municipal politics in conjunction with voter mobilization efforts in
the wake of Katrina. Our finding about the characteristics of the voters who participated
in the mayoral election given the flooding provides us insights into the scope of change
for the political landscape of New Orleans after the hurricane.
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2 Introduction
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, then a Category 3 storm, made landfall near
Buras, Louisiana. The storm produced significant rainfall in the Gulf Coast region, rang-
ing from 8 to 12 inches (Knabb, Rhome and Brown 2005, page 10). This rain, combined
with strong winds and severe storm surge, caused multiple failures to the Lake Pontchar-
train flood protection system. These failures resulted in approximately 80 percent of the
City of New Orleans being flooded. The flooding was so extensive that recovery efforts
in the city and region continue to this day.1
The flooding of New Orleans resulted in a massive and rapid exodus of individuals
from NewOrleans to locations around the United States. According to the RAND Corpo-
ration, the population of NewOrleans went from 485,000 before Hurricane Katrina struck
the city to a population of 155,000 in 2006; the ”homes of about 55 percent of the city’s
population — 268,000 people — suffered severe damage after parts of New Orleans were
inundated by floodwaters more than 4 feet deep when the hurricane hit and levees were
breeched” (McCarthy et al. 2006). This level of damage meant that individuals were not
merely forced out for the duration of the hurricane and a short period after; instead, a
large segment of the New Orleans population was forced out of the city for an extended
period.2
Although the general geography of New Orleans is at or below sea level, the actual
extent of flooding varied across the city, based on this geography and where the breaches
to the levees occurred. Studies have indicated that large sections of New Orleans were
flooded bymore than six feet of water, and parts of Lakeview, Gentilly, NewOrleans East,
and the Lower Ninth Ward were flooded with more than ten feet of water (ASCE 2007,
1Knabb, Rhome and Brown (2005) of the National Hurricane Center, wrote that “Katrina was on of the
most devastating natural disasters in United States history” (page 1). Further into their report, they note
that there were dramatic storm surges in Lake Pontchartain, for example, surges of 15 to 19 feet in eastern
New Orleans, and 10 to 14 feet in western New Orleans (page 9)
2RAND estimates that in September 2008 (three years after Hurricane Katrina), the population of New
Orleans will only be 56 percent of its pre-Katrina population — or 272,000 of the original population of
485,000.
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32, Figure 5.10). In Figure 1 we display the depth of the flooding for all of New Orleans
by Census Block, where darker colors indicate increased flood depth.
Figure 1 Goes Here
In the midst of the hurricane recovery, the City of New Orleans held an important
mayoral election. The election raised an array of questions regarding when the election
should be held (if it should be postponed), under what electoral rules and procedures
should the election be held, and what the implications of the population diaspora would
be on the campaign and election. Arguments regarding when the election would be held
were largely driven by the views that people had on what the impact of the diaspora
would be on the voting population in New Orleans. With more than half of the city’s
population gone, the unknown was who would be able to vote.
We begin by providing a context for understanding the aftermath of Hurricane Ka-
trina, including the debate that surrounded the election and its administration, and a
theoretical framework for understanding why we expect some voters to continue vot-
ing even after the hurricane devastated New Orleans. We then test three hypotheses.
First, we hypothesize that voters who incurred flooding would be less likely to vote. The
flooding damage and related disruptions would, we think, increase the costs of voting
for all voters. Second, aligned with the literature on which individuals are likely to vote,
we anticipate that there will be interactions between the flood depth and the individual
voter characteristics which are consistent with the hypothesis that some types of voters
(individuals with low socioeconomic status, for example) will have a particularly more
difficult time voting when the turnout cost increases. Here we will look carefully at the
interactions between flood depth and particular groups to determine if we see patterns
of which voters are most affected by increasing the cost of voting. Specifically, we predict
that the flood most affected voters who have historically had a more difficult time casting
a vote, and many of whom were unlikely to vote prior to Katrina — voters for whom an
increase in the cost of voting is likely to make voting particularly difficult. Our concern
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with heterogeneous costs is that for these voters their higher levels of absence from the
pool of eligible voters would significantly change the outcomes of the election and the
quality of representation during the Katrina recovery. Finally, consistent with the liter-
ature on motivation, we hypothesize that, while flooding does decrease turnout, it does
not do so in a monotonic fashion, and in particular, that those voters who experienced the
worst flooding may in fact be the most likely voters.
We answer these questions with voter history databases that span twenty years of
elections in New Orleans. These data were supplemented with Census data, and with
data on the devastation caused by the hurricane collected by the Louisiana State Univer-
sity. We use voting data, economic and social variables, as well as information regarding
the highest level of flooding that occurred by Census block throughout the city. This is
the first study of its kind to use individual level data. In addition, we apply the most
rigorous statistical methods possible to draw inferences about the effect of flood depth
on participation. In particular we apply propensity score matching in order to compare
individuals across flood depths, in a way that allows us to test whether the relationship
between flooding depth and turnout is linear.
We find that flooding does decrease turnout, but contrary to our expectations, there
are no statistically significant interactions between voter characteristics and flood depth.
Thus although voting is to some extent depressed in the post-Katrina era, there is some
reason for optimism: we do not find that the effect of flooding is worse for particular
groups. Most interestingly, for those with the highest levels of flooding, they appear to
have been mobilized to participate in politics. We recognize that the literature in political
science has typically considered participation to be determined by resources, recruitment,
or motivation. Our findings here demonstrate the power of motivation and recruitment.
3 The Hurricane and Its Aftermath
Katrina hit New Orleans shortly before the city was to conduct a regularly-scheduled
mayoral election. Incumbent Mayor Ray Nagin, who had first been elected to office in
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2002, became internationally-known in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, due to his
frequent television appearances and some concerns about his handling of the situation
in New Orleans immediately after Katrina struck. Due to the concerns about his perfor-
mance in office, by the time the municipal primary election season arrived, Nagin found
that he had twenty-two challengers, including Lt. Governor Mitch Landrieu.
But the devastation left by Katrina raised many questions about whether the 2006
mayoral election should be held, when it should be held, and if held who would be able
to cast ballots. The primary view among many advocacy groups was that the election
should be either postponed or the election rules should be liberalized andmodes of voting
expanded to ensure that the displaced African American voters would be able to cast
ballots in the election (AP 2005). However, the problems with holding the election were
as much administrative as racial or political. As the New York Times reported, ”something
as simple as sending a mailing to people in a district ... has become a logistical thicket.
Many of the address lists vanished when computers were submerged and, even if they
could be found, the addresses were often meaningless” (Levy 2005). Many community
meetings regarding the reconstruction of the city and regarding relief services were held
outside the city because of lack of appropriate facilities for public meetings and because
of the population diaspora. Moreover, there were concerns that the returning population
was primarily White, which could harm the electoral chances of incumbent Mayor Ray
Nagin, who is African American.
The mayoral election was postponed in December 2005 by order of Louisiana Gov-
ernor Kathleen Blanco. Originally scheduled to be held in February 2006, the Governor
indefinitely postponed the election based on the recommendations of Secretary of State
Al Ater and state elections commissioner Angie LaPlace. Ater noted that many of the
city’s polling places were completely destroyed and much of the city’s voting equipment
had been devastated as well (AP 2005). An election date of April 22 was eventually set
for the municipal primary election in New Orleans.
With the primary election day set, the key question becamewhatmethod voters would
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use to cast their ballot. One proposal was to set up ”satellite” polling places outside of
New Orleans and outside Louisiana that would allow displaced voters to go to a polling
place to cast a ballot. The legislature did create a total of ten remote polling places outside
the City of New Orleans, within the state of Louisiana, but rejected the idea of having
remote polling locations established outside the State. Although lawsuits were filed to
force the Secretary of State to establish out-of-state satellite voting locations, the federal
courts refused on February 23 to either delay the election beyond April 22 or to require
satellite voting (AP 2006a). Again on March 28, a judge refused to delay the election (AP
2006b).
Instead, the Court decided that election liberalization legislation that had been passed
by the Louisiana legislature was sufficient to ensure that the election would be fair. The
liberalized election laws included allowing absentee voting for individuals who had never
voted in person at a precinct. They also allowed voters to request a ballot by fax on elec-
tion day, vote the ballot, and fax the ballot back on election day. In addition, voters who
were displaced could receive a special exemption to the state’s traditional ballot return
requirements. Normally, ballots were required to be received the day prior to the elec-
tion. For displaced absentee voters, their ballots could be postmarked on the day prior
to election day if the appropriate affidavit were included with the ballot (Times-Picayune
2006). In addition, the state was given the authority to make modifications to the ad-
ministration of the election that would facilitate voting in a devastated city. However, all
legislative changes to the election, and several procedural changes, had to be approved
by the Justice Department under the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Numerous new administrative procedures were adopted as well, either at the state or
the local level. At the state level, Secretary of State Ater required that a chain-of-custody
paper trail be created to track every action in the election in order to combat any litiga-
tion that resulted from the election outcome.3 For example, all calls to the state’s elec-
tion hotline were tracked in a database and every absentee ballot was tracked using the
3See Alvarez and Hall (2008) for a discussion of chains of custody in elections.
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United States Postal Service tracking service. Election officials also created a set of ”mega
polling places” that combined a large number of voting precincts into a single polling
place (Thevenot 2006a). The entire voter registration system was put online so that poll
workers could help to get voters to the correct polling place and precinct. In addition to
expanded absentee voting for displaced voters, some voters either drove or were bussed
to participate in early voting in Louisiana (Filosa and Nolan 2006; Thevenot 2006b).
The first round of the 2006 New Orleans mayoral election (held April 22, 2006) was a
contest between 22 candidates and, as no candidate received a majority of votes cast, re-
sulted in the need for a runoff election, scheduled to take place onMay 20, 2006.4 Mayoral
incumbent Ray Nagin won 38% of the vote in April and 52% of the vote in May, resulting
in his final victory. We focus our attention on the runoff mayoral election (held May 20,
2006) which had a higher turnout rate (113,591 compared to 108,153) and had received a
larger amount of publicity. The later election date also allowed each voter additional time
to determine how to cast a ballot in the Katrina aftermath.
4 TheMayoral Election and Political Participation: Recruit-
ment and Motivation
The underlying issue for critics of the 2006 mayoral election, such as the Reverend Jesse
Jackson, was the concern that African American voters would not have the skills to nav-
igate the electoral process, especially once they were displaced. As the Times-Picayune
(Finch 2006) reported;
NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Damon Hewitt told [U.S. District Judge
Ivan Lemelle] that there are ”significant gaps in voter access to the ballot,”
including difficulty that many displaced voters would have getting back to
the city to vote and recent changes in the location of numerous polling sites in
the city. ”No one remedy alone is sufficient to cure these violations,” he said.
4See the Louisiana Secretary of State’s record of the mayoral primary election, http://www400.sos.
louisiana.gov:8090/cgibin/?rqstyp=elcpr&rqsdta=04220636.
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Both Jackson and NAACP officials argued that the absentee ballot process was very
confusing and that there were not enough remote voting sites outside of New Orleans
(Thevenot 2006c).
Hurricane Katrina raised dual concerns about voter participation in the mayoral elec-
tion. One concern was that the displacement of voters itself would have a direct and neg-
ative affect on voters most affected by the flooding. Specifically, Katrina might impose a
high cost of voting on those directly displaced by the flooding, because they would not
necessarily have easy access to polling places or voting materials on election day. The
second concern was that the complex array of procedures that were put in place to make
voting easier for displaced voters might, contrary to their intentions, raise the costs and
reduce the participation of the very individuals these procedures were designed to assist.
These concerns mesh well with theoretical models of voter participation, models that
have been shown to have solid empirical foundations through decades of research. Sem-
inal theoretical work by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) articulated the
notion that when it is more costly for an individual to participate in an election, ceteris
paribus, the less likely it is for that individual to participate. This basic theoretical notion
has been documented in a long line of work, beginning with the important contribution
of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980). It and many later studies (e.g., Leighley and Nagler
(1992); Nagler (1991)) have shown that complex procedures can hinder the participation
of many voters, especially those who many not have the resources necessary to overcome
these hurdles.
Verba, and Schlozman and Brady (1995) provided a deeper demonstration of the im-
portance of resources — such as time, money, civic skills — that allow an individual to
navigate the world of politics. Resource rich individuals are more engaged and interested
in politics, and have connections to others that mobilizes them to participate. People who
have resources, civic skills, engagement and connections to mobilization networks are
much more likely to participate in politics. Congruent with this observation is the hy-
pothesis that individuals who belong to particular groups tend to behave similarly— and
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many of those individuals who participate in politics report doing so because someone
they knew asked them to participate. Similarity of behavior within a social framework is
demonstrated across many classifications of social group structures, ranging from corre-
lations in behaviors within urban ghettos and amongst home owners (Cutler and Glaeser
1997). Although there may have been a decline in social capital among American vot-
ers (Putnam 1993, 1995) , the relationship of individuals to particular groups is a good
predictor of individual behavior (Coleman 1990). Finally, and relatedly, there is recent
research that combines some of these strands and argues that voting participation may
be something like habitual behavior (Plutzer 2002): once individuals are habituated into
the behavior of voting (by sociological or political factors) they are likely to continue the
habit of voting.
The flooding and displacement caused by Hurricane Katrina clearly increased the cost
of voting for many individuals who had lived there prior to the flooding event. Although
we cannot directly quantify these costs, we can compare these costs to those in a typical
election. Consider, for example, that we know that moving a polling place one mile in
a normal election can reduce turnout by one-half percent and that precinct consolidation
generally results in reduced turnout (Brady and McNulty 2002; Dyck and Gimpel 2005;
Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and Knotts 2005). Moreover, efforts to make voting
more convenient typically do not increase turnout but instead merely make it easier for
medium- to high-propensity voters to participate (Berinsky 2005; Flower 2006). In the
2006 mayoral elections, the election had both a consolidation of precincts, because many
previously-used polling places were destroyed by the flood, and an expansion of conve-
nience voting methods (early, absentee, and quasi-vote centers).5 However, we should
not expect, based on traditional research, for these improvements to improve turnout.
While the flooding caused by Katrina might have imposed a significant fixed cost on
those who wanted to vote in the mayoral election, it is also the case that those who faced
the highest flooding might have been highly motivated to vote. Here we posit that voters
5See Stein and Vonnahme (2008) for a review of voter turnout and convenience voting.
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are affected by recruitment and increased motivational to express their political prefer-
ences. As Gerber and Green (2000) have noted, personal mobilization can play a critical
role in improving turnout. In a multi-mode experiment, they found that face to face con-
tacts can increase turnout by almost 10%. Althoughwe have no data on efforts tomobilize
Katrina victims — either those who were displaced or those who were able to remain in
New Orleans — media accounts tell us that there were significant efforts to contact these
victims using all three contact modes mentioned above. For example, The Metropolitan
Organization in Houston conducted a face-to-face campaign to sign up 10,000 absentee
voters (Moreno 2006) and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN) conducted organizing campaigns in several cities, including Texas and Geor-
gia, and provided bus transportation to allow voters to vote in person in Louisiana for
the election. ACORN hired canvassers to go door-to-door in apartment complexes with
high numbers of displaced voters, with the intention of registering them to vote, getting
them absentee ballots, and/or offering them rides to the polls (The Hotline 2006). The
candidates also engaged in mobilization efforts; for example, incumbent mayor Ray Na-
gin campaigned in several surrounding states in order to rally voters and his campaign
also conducted face-to-face campaigning in states neighboring Louisiana.
The Louisiana Secretary of State, Al Ater, also noted that the catastrophe should be
considered a motivational experience for voters, encouraging them to participate in the
election and in the subsequent rebuilding of the city. Ater stated, ”If this whole crisis,
this whole disaster doesn’t motivate people, I don’t think we’re ever going to get them
motivated, are we?” (Moreno 2006). One displaced voter echoed this, saying ”[voting] is
the start of getting my life back” (Simpson 2006). Voters had reasons to be motivated to
participate in the election that would determine who would lead the rebuilding of their
city.
This motivation to participate and the importance of the mayoral election can be seen
in national surveys as well as surveys conducted only of Louisiana residents. A survey
of Louisiana resident adults by the Pew Center for People and the Press found that ”just
10
34% give state and local governments an excellent or good rating on their handling of
the disaster, down from 41% last week. Public evaluations of the federal government’s
response [were] 37% positive, 61% negative.”6 At the national level, there were concerns
about the quality of the response to Katrina just two weeks after the disaster.
A state-level survey conducted by Louisiana State University also illustrates how im-
portant the election was for residents of New Orleans.7 In this survey, the data show that
the state government and New Orleans city government ranked last in a list of 12 organi-
zations — including the federal government and FEMA— in evaluations of effectiveness
in hurricane response. In addition, respondents were aware that the post-Katrina period
would continue to be one where government would be tested, through choices regarding
budget cuts, rebuilding efforts, and service provision. Respondents also were personally
affected and were likely motivated by that as well. For example, more than half of re-
spondents felt depressed (53%), 41% were unable to work and lost income, and 39% felt
angry because of the storms.
Because it is possible that Katrina gave New Orleans voters a strong incentive to vote
in order to hold their local elected officials accountable for their handling of the Katrina
crisis, we hypothesize that highly motivated and frequently contacted voters will be more
likely to turn out to vote. We are also able, within this data, to test theories of political
motivation. Here we expect that increasing the depth of the flooding will increase the
desire of voters to express their preferences. The motivational story here is expressive;
the voters prefer to cast a ballot, and in fact their preference to do so may increase as costs
increase. Although we anticipate a decrease in the chances of participation for voters
affected by flooding, we anticipate that there will be a conflicting effect as well — some
voters strongly affected by the floodingwill be highly interested in casting a vote. In some
ways, the simple descriptive data provide some support for the idea that despite the mas-
sive dislocation Katrina induced, New Orleans voters did figure out how to participate
6http://people-press.org/report/256.pdf
7”The 2005 Louisiana Survey: Post Hurricane Community Audit.” Published by the Reilly Center for
Media and Public Affairs. November 20, 2005. Manuscript. Louisiana State University.
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in the mayoral elections in 2006. In 2002, during Nagin’s first run for mayor, 45.7% of
registered voters participated in the mayoral primary (February 2, 2002), and 44.3% par-
ticipated in the mayoral general election (March 2, 2002); in 2006, the turnout percentages
were 36.8% and 38.5%, respectively.8 Certainly, turnout was lower in the 2006 mayoral
elections than in the same type of elections in 2002, but the reduction in turnout is not
necessarily as dramatic as one might anticipate given Katrina’s damage.
This hypothesis — that turnout will increase with motivation and recruitment — is
consistent with literature on the expressive act of casting a ballot. Scholars suggest that
voters will be more likely to vote when the civic duty term is larger than the cost of vot-
ing; if for example, voting increases the likelihood of the preservation of a democracy
(Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Blais 2000). Voters may also receive psycho-
logical benefit from voting (Schuessler 2000, Brennan and Buchanan 1984, Fiorina 1976).
Voting may be in this sense a consumption good where voters seek to express themselves
and are not concerned about being pivotal but instead place value, for some particular
reason, on the act of casting a ballot (Silver 1986, Hinich 1981). This motivation may come
from a particular experience, for example, Blattman (2008) finds that child conscription in
Uganda results in a 22% increased likelihood of voting as an adult. Here we test another
hypothesis as well — that voters who are particularly affected by flood depth will have
additional motivation to turn out to vote. We use a particular statistical methodology that
will allow us to evaluate the probability of voting given that we hypothesize there may
be a nonlinear effect of flooding on turnout.
Given the commentary that surrounded the election and its aftermath regarding the
stability of representation in the city (Would Mayor Ray Nagin, who is African Ameri-
can, be reelected?) and whether the real or potential voting population would change
because the voters are themselves different (such as fewer Democrats or African Ameri-
cans in the voting population), these questions are highly relevant to understanding the
impact of a highly disruptive natural disaster on a city’s politics. These results have the
8These data some from the Louisiana Secretary of State, http://www400.sos.louisiana.gov/
stats/Post Election Statistics/Parish.
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potential to be highly generalizable in the following sense: in the post-9/11 world and
in the current environment of global climate change, there is an increased likelihood that
such highly disruptive events will occur in other places (e.g., Alvarez and Hall 2008; Beck
1999). The 9/11 attack did disturb the mayoral election in New York City and, had it been
more disruptive on Manhattan, it could have changed the voting population in the city.
Similarly, natural disasters like Katrina could easily disrupt elections in many large and
diverse cities in the United States, including other major cities along the Eastern seaboard
and Gulf of Mexico that are potentially susceptible to future hurricanes, cities along the
Pacific Rim that are in active tectonic zones, and even cities throughout the interior which
might see future elections disrupted by major natural or man-made events. As some
commentators have noted, little has been done to plan for how such events might affect
elections and even government transitions (Fortier and Ornstein 2004; Hall 2003; Kiewiet
et al. 2008).
5 Data
The Louisiana Secretary of State’s office provided us with a voter file dataset, including
individual data on all registered voters in the NewOrleans parish, which includes 238,627
individuals. This file incorporates data from all 17 wards, some of which, like the Lower
9th Ward are now, post-Katrina, ubiquitous for the amount of flooding they experienced;
the file also includes wards that experienced no flooding whatsoever. As noted in the
Appendix, the voter file was augmented using Census block group information from
Census Summary Files 1 and 3. The variance in the extent of flooding, combined with
the wealth of information observed both in the voter history file, and data observed at
the Census block level, will allow us to evaluate the extent to which flooding caused by
Katrina influenced voter behavior in New Orleans’ recent mayoral election.
From this voter file, we observe, for each registered voter, the last twenty elections in
which that individual has participated and when each voter registered.9 From these two
9Note that this is distinct from their participation in the last twenty elections — this variable records
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variables we produce a ”propensity to vote” variable that is calculated as a percent of the
elections in which the individual participated divided by the number of eligible elections.
In our dataset, the average voter propensity is 39.45% (with a standard deviation of 25%)
and this variable takes values which range from 0 to 100%. This is the variable that we
use to measure the effect of Katrina’s flooding on habitual voters.
We also observe a number of characteristics about each individual. From their birth
date we are able to discern their age – the average age of registered voters in this file is
46.37 years. Because Louisiana is required under the Voting Rights Act of 1964 to record
the race of each registered voter, we know whether each registered voter is white or non-
white: approximately 66% of the registered voters in this dataset fall under the nonwhite
category. We know each registrant’s party registration status and from this information
we produce an indicator variable which states whether or not the individual’s party reg-
istration is Democratic. About 67% of the individuals in the dataset are registered Demo-
cratic. We observe turnout in the first large election which occurred in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina — the May runoff mayoral 2006 election. Of the registered voters in
2006, 38.21% cast ballots for the May runoff mayoral election; 36.80% cast ballots in the
April 2006 mayoral primary election.10
Thus, the average individual in our dataset is more likely to be a nonwhite (66%), fe-
male (56%), registered Democratic voter (67%). Out of the last 20 (or fewer) elections for
which they were eligible to vote, they have voted in approximately 39% and are approx-
imately 46 years old. This average individual in our sample lives in a census blockgroup
where 24% of the population has a high school diploma, 52% of the occupied housing
units are renter occupied, and the median household income is $32,206.11
Each registrant’s address is recorded in the voter file. Using this United States postal
the specific elections, up to twenty, in which the individual has participated. These elections could have
occurred decades earlier. If the voter was eligible to participate in fewer than twenty elections, then the
denominator here is the number of elections they were eligible to vote in.
10For discussion about the use of voter history or voter registration files for research like ours, see Mc-
Donald (2007).
11These variables are described in more detail in the Appendix.
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address, the voter location was spatially located using ESRI’s Streetmap c© geocodable
roads. This was done using a standard GIS procedure called geocoding that provides
Latitude and Longitude for each address. Out of a possible 295,277 records, a total of
238,627 were kept in the dataset — these were both successfully matched to their ap-
propriate addresses and had no missing covariates in the registration file.12 Using data
from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), we overlay each address with the ap-
proximate depth of the flood water post Hurricane Katrina. We tabulate the number of
registered voter households who are affected by each category of water depth in Table 1.
Almost a third of the voters had residences which were unaffected by Katrina flooding
and remarkably few voters, only 43, had floodwater over 10 feet. The category of flooding
with the highest number of affected voters is 5 feet of flooding.13
Table 1 Goes Here
This data provides a unique opportunity to analyze turnout behavior in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. In particular, almost all of our variables are individual level data, in-
cluding the depth of the floodwater and the individual characteristics of each registrant.
Much of the analysis thus far on Hurricane Katrina has dealt with aggregate data on
turnout, race and district-level characteristics (for example, Logan 2006); this presents a
problem commonly referred to as the ecological inference problem, where individual-level
inferences are made using aggregate-level data. It has long been known in the social sci-
ence research literature that individual-level inferences drawn from aggregate-level data
are suspect, unless special care is taken to try to alleviate known biases in such ecological
inferences (or the researcher uses individual-level data to make individual-level infer-
ences, as we do).14 The prior findings differ from our own for this reason — here we are
12We dropped 1173 individuals who are missing age information in the registration file are dropped from
all analyses and 4 individuals who had no registration date. The remaining individuals are excluded as we
were unable to match their listed address to an address recognizable on a USGS map.
13It is important to keep in mind that our population is registered voters, not the potentially larger pop-
ulation of New Orleans residents.
14The methodological literature on the basic ecological inference problem is well summarized in Achen
and Shively (1995), and King (1997).
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able to draw valid individual-level inferences with individual-level data, and to do so
with the most rigorous statistical techniques possible.
6 Flooding and Turnout
We compare registered voter households with flooding against registered voter house-
holds who effectively had no floodwater in order to determine the effect of flooding on
turnout in the May 2006 mayoral election. The turnout pattern by flood depth in May
is similar to the pattern we observe in the April 2006 election as well. In Figure 2 we
present the percentage turnout by flood depth (in feet) for each registered voter house-
hold in our dataset. When we compare Katrina’s flooding to turnout in both elections,
we see a very counterintuitive pattern. Had the extent of flooding presented a uniform
barrier to voter participation, we would have expected to see a negative relationship be-
tween flooding and turnout: turnout should be high in areas with little or no flooding
and turnout should fall as the flooding increased. We anticipate this pattern because we
know that, with enough flood water, residents were forced to leave New Orleans. Over
half of New Orleans’ residents had not yet returned at the time of the primary election.15
Instead, we see in Figure 2 something like a curvilinear relationship: high voter turnout
in locations with little or no flooding, but equally high voter turnout in locations with
the most extensive flooding. This conclusion, reached simply by examining the bivariate
relationship between turnout and flooding, is one we will later examine in more detail in
our multivariate analysis.16
15Says the Associated Press in ”Katrina Evacuees Cast Early Votes in New Orleans Mayoral Race” as of
Monday, April 10, 2006, of the city’s primary mayoral election, ”Fewer than half New Orleans’ residents
have been able to return to their devastated neighborhoods. New Orleans had nearly a half-million people,
about 70 percent of them black, before Hurricane Katrina. Those who have returned number fewer than
200,000 and most are white.”
16One possibility, which we explored due to a large amount of coverage in the media, was that the elec-
toral consequences of Katrina flooding was due to a large extent to the particular ward effects. However,
our findings indicate that is not the case. Although some wards sustained significantly different levels of
damage and flooding, the average flood depth across wards is fairly constant. Looking at the percentage
of registered voter households for each of the 17 wards that sustained more than four feet of flooding, this
value varies only between 16-17%. Additionally, there are no great trends by ward with respect to flooding
and turnout. This gives us reason to believe that in fact there will not be ward-specific effects in our analysis
16
Figure 2 Goes Here
7 Methods And Results
Based upon Figure 2, we recognize that a simple statistical analysis of the bivariate re-
lationship between Katrina-induced flooding and turnout in the mayoral election is not
sufficient given that there may not be a straightforward linear relationship between flood-
ing and turnout. We therefore utilize a variety of methods to test the functional form; in
four statistical models we successively relax the assumptions about the relationship be-
tween the depth of the flood water and a particular functional form to investigate the
effect of flood depth on turnout in the 2006 mayoral contest in New Orleans. Consistent
with our observation that the relationship between flood depth and turnout reported ear-
lier does not appear to be linear, we find that, although flood depth does increase the cost
of turning out to vote, the effect of the depth of flooding is not linear and additive.
We begin with a simple analysis to analyze likely voters in a classic turnout model; we
first model turnout in the mayoral campaign as a function of an individual’s characteris-
tics, including the depth of the flood water post-Katrina. Thus the model is:
Mayoral vote = α+ β1 ∗X + 
whereX is a matrix of voter characteristics that include flood depth after Katrina, gender,
race, age, party registration, and propensity to vote and  is distributed logistically.17
and we focus on the flood depth on an individual level. In Table 9 we document the extent of more than
five feet of flooding by zipcode and break this down into the percentage of individuals affected by more
than five feet of flooding who were residents of blockgroups that were more than 50% black. We discern no
clear patterns.
17We also consider a model where we take the log of the flood depth variable with the concern that given
the distribution of depth seen in Table 1 that we might anticipate this distribution would not have a normal
relationship with the voting outcomes. A reasonable transformation is then to take the log of the flood
depth variable, however, given the presence of zeros this is not directly possible. We first transform the
flood depth (which ranges from 0 to 10) into a variable which is extremely similar, so that flood = .995 *
flood depth + .005. We then take the log of this new flood variable. The coefficient from this model is
similar in magnitude and statistical significance; thus we continue to simply use the absolute depth for
ease of interpretation in our analyses.
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We present the coefficients for each of the variables in Table 2. We find that the coeffi-
cient on the flood depth is negative, as anticipated. As the amount of flooding increased,
the probability that individuals would then be able to successfully cast a ballot in themay-
oral contest should decrease, in large part becausemany of those residents were displaced
by the flooding. This displacement should have increased the costs of voting, making it
more difficult for voters to cast absentee ballots ahead of the election. Many organizations
orchestrated bus trips to New Orleans so that voters could cast mayoral ballots and a bus
ride from Texas to New Orleans, for example, dramatically increases the cost of voting.
We find that the coefficient on the gender variable is effectively zero (and not statistically
significant) as is the coefficient for the nonwhite indicator. Surprisingly, the age variable
is negative and statistically significant, but effectively zero (the coefficient value is -.001).
The variables that do seem to impact the turnout decision—other than the flood depth
— are Democratic registration and vote history. The coefficient on Democratic party reg-
istration is positive, which is surprising as many of the neighborhoods which experienced
the worst flooding were also majority Democratic. However, as the two main candidates
in the runoff election were both Democrats (Ray Nagin and Mitch Landrieu), it is also
possible that Democratic voters were more interested in the election. The coefficient on
vote history is large and positive, which we would expect. The relationship between vot-
ing history and turnout is extremely strong but there is little correlation between voting
history and flood depth (correlation coefficient is .024). As the flooding did not primar-
ily then take place in neighborhoods with high voting propensities, it is possible that the
votes cast in May 2006 are similar in terms of the types of individuals they represent to
those cast in earlier elections. The vote history variable also captures a large amount of
the variance associated with the other characteristics that tend to predict turnout (socioe-
conomic status, for example). Leaving this variable out of the model results in a large,
negative, and statistically significant coefficient estimate for race, for example. The co-
efficients produced from this model are fairly consistent with those we would anticipate
from the literature on turnout. We present the coefficients from a model estimated when
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excluding the vote history variable in the second column of Table 2. From this table we
conclude that in fact the depth of flooding decreases the probability that an individual
casts a ballot in the mayoral election. Our next analysis will investigate whether or not
any of these particular covariates interact with the depth of flooding. Consistent with
what we find in the second column of this table, and although the vote history variable
does capture a great deal of the variance associated with turnout, we will exclude it as it
likely masks the effects of the flood depth and other characteristics.
Table 2 Goes Here
Our second analysis incorporates both the interactions between the water depth and
the voter demographics, as well as a series of community characteristics. Thus our new
model is:
Mayoral vote = α+ β1 ∗X + β2 ∗ Z + β3 ∗W + 
where X is the identical matrix as described above, Z is a matrix of some of the variables
in X interacted with the flood depth, andW is a matrix of community-based characteris-
tics, measured at the block group level that includes the education level of the blockgroup,
the median income of the blockgroup, and information on the type of housing (percent
renter occupied) for the blockgroup. We assume  is logistically distributed. We include
these variables as control variables and use them as proxies for the individual data.
This analysis enables us to examine our second hypothesis — that the interaction of
flood depth and vote propensity should be positively related to the probability of voting
in the mayoral contest. Here we hypothesize that those voters who are nonwhite, Demo-
cratic, younger, and are residents of blockgroups with less education, more renters, and
lower median incomes, will be more affected by flood damage. It seems unlikely that
the additional costs associated with post-flood voting would be evenly distributed across
groups. We present the coefficients from this model in Table 3.
Table 3 Goes Here
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Only one coefficient for the interaction is statistically significant — the coefficient be-
tween flood depth and Democratic registration — in Table 3 is not consistent. Our hy-
potheses about the effects of interactions are not supported here — in particular, the
marginal effect of flooding for Democratic registrants is positive. For an additional one
foot of flooding, the odds of a Democratic registrant voting would decrease less than for
any other party registrant. Our other coefficients are sensible and consistent with the hy-
pothesis that increasing flooding is likely to decrease turnout. In particular, in the second
column of Table 3, we exclude the blockgroup variables (since we know there may be bi-
ases introduced by using aggregate variables) and find results that are extremely similar.
One possible explanation for thee results is simply the fact that the flood depth effects
may not be linear and additive. This seems likely given the difficulty in understanding the
coefficients presented in Table 3 in the context of the traditional voter turnout literature.
It is likely that particular neighborhoods were affected disproportionately by the flood—
one component of this may simply be in the targeting, post-Katrina, of different categories
of social services. We are cautious in using these results as we understand that we are
effectively treating an ordinal variable as though it were continuous. Given this concern,
we turn to a different technique.
In order to better analyze the true treatment effects of the flood variable, we apply a
method for determining appropriate cutpoints for the effect of flooding on mayoral vote
(Walter, Feinstein and Wells 1987). First, we produce an indicator variable XK for eachK
feet of flooding, where XK = 0 if the flood depth is below K and 1 if the flood depth is
equal to or above K. We incorporate each of these variables (X1 through X10) such that
the model is:
Mayoral vote = α+ β1 ∗X1 + β2 ∗X2 + . . .+ βK ∗XK + βK+1 ∗W + 
where W is a matrix of voter characteristics that include gender, race, age, vote history
and party registration, and each of the XKs is included with X0 used as a base case and 
is distributed logistically.
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We then analyze the results from this regression, in particular focusing upon the coef-
ficients from each of the XKs. The interpretation of each of the coefficients for each of the
XKs is as follows: the coefficient evaluates the relative impact of flooding between values
k and k + 1 compared to no flooding. For each XK that has a coefficient which is itself
statistically significant we determine that there is a true cutpoint at each of those values,
so that in fact the probability that an individual votes in the mayoral election is affected
by flooding between the twoXKs with significant coefficients. After our analysis, we find
that there are six XK values which qualify: these are flood depths of 1,2,6,7, and 9. We
repeat the above model incorporating only those XK values. These results are presented
in Table 4.
Table 4 Goes Here
With this method, we are able to see the jumps in treatment effects because we are
no longer constrained to incorporate the flood variable as both linear and additive. The
coefficients for theXK variables range from positive to negative, implying that particular
groups are often more affected by flooding than others. We observe a negative coefficient
for flooding from 1-2 feet, but positive and statistically coefficients from 3 or more feet.
The range in coefficients appears initially quite unintuitive, but in fact it is simply likely
that the flood increased the cost of voting for individuals in some categories but not in
others. Although it is surprising is that there is such a positive and statistically significant
effect of flooding depth on turnout for flood depth of 6 feet or more, it is possible that
these individuals were simply more likely to turnout already — that, for example, their
voting history indicated theywere likely voters. These results indicate that there is indeed
a non-monotonic effect of flood depth on turnout. As we present the results from our final
statistical technique, we anticipate finding a non-linear and in particular non-monotonic
result from the coefficients we observe in Table 4.
We now turn to a final statistical technique which allows us to compare individuals
directly with the fewest possible assumptions about the functional form used to describe
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the impact of flood depth. We have observed in the above results that a linear functional
formwas not appropriate, and furthermorewe do not necessarily have a particular theory
to motivate the choice of functional form. Therefore, in order to ensure that our results are
not a consequence of ourmodeling assumptions, we apply a propensitymatchingmethod
to the existing data, considering the treatment each individual received as the number of
feet of flooding they experienced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. We let ti indicate
that registered voter i has been exposed to treatment ti, where ti can range from 0 to 10 in
terms of depth of flooding. We observe themayoral turnout, yi for each i, and, in addition,
a series of covariates Xi, where Xi includes all individual-level covariates. Matching is
necessary because ti and Xi are not independent, for example, it seems likely that areas
with higher median household income for example, there would be less flooding. We
pre-process our data to eliminate the relationship between ti and Xi: to do this, we must
locate individuals across different flood depth values who have identical covariates and
perform our analysis on these individuals only. Analysis on these individuals will return
results that are similar to those from a randomized experiment and, to a large extent,
there is little relationship already between the different treatment groups as the flooding
from Hurricane Katrina struck without regard to many of the covariates included in our
models.
We assess the differences in covariates by flood depth for the data before we pull out
the matched sample. We look at the means of each covariate by flood depth. Table 5
presents these values for each of the covariates of interest by flood depth. Although there
are differences which are apparent across flood depths, these differences are not large and
are easily correctable via matching.
Table 5 Goes Here
We begin by isolating individuals across different flood depth values with similar
characteristics (matching), and we assess the quality of this comparison with a technique
referred to as ”balance”, where we compare the distributions of the covariates by flood
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depth to assess their similarity. We do so using the statistical software MatchIt (2004) and
employing subclassification matching.18 This process is designed to match observations
when there are many covariates to consider for the treatment and control groups. The
goal is to form subclasses where the distribution of the covariate values is identical for
the treatment and control groups as opposed the exact values of the covariates. After
pulling out a subset of observations, we then assess the quality of the match by looking
at the percentage of observations that are balanced before and after the match as well as
presenting quantile-quantile-plots for each covariate for each treatment pair.19 Table 6
presents information on the quality of the match in terms of the percent improvement
for each covariate for each treatment pair. Percentage improvement is measured as |a|−|b||a|
where a is the balance before and b is the balance after matching. We only observe a de-
crease in the balance for two categories: for five feet of flooding, the percentage in the
blockgroup who are high school graduates increases in terms of distance between zero
feet and five feet, and for nine feet of flooding, there is a decrease in balance for the indi-
viduals who are registered as Democratic.
Table 6 Goes Here
Another way to compare the matched and unmatched samples in order to understand
the quality of the match is to evaluate the quantile-quantile plots. Here we present only
one set of such plots, the remainder of which are available from the authors upon request.
In the figures below, there is little visible improvement to the dataset (these observations
compare the flooding at zero feet with the flooding at one foot). However, in both cases,
the balance is fairly close — most of the observations surround the 45 degree line — and
given that this is the case, we have confidence in these estimates.
18For a review of the matching literature refer to Ho, Imai, King and Stuart (2007), and for a review
of this particular procedure, see Imai and van Dyk (2004). Note that the authors also ensured that their
results were consistent across matching methods; these include genetic matching, optimal matching, and
nearest-neighbor matching. These results are available from the authors by request.
19A quantile-quantile plot is used to see if two data sets come from populations with the same distribu-
tion; it plots the quantiles of the first data set against the second. If the two sets come from a population
with the same distribution, all the points should fall approximately along the 45 degree line.
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Figures 3 - Figure 5 Go Here
In our analysis of results based upon these data, we consider the treatment effect com-
paring zero flooding to flooding in each of the categories. Each individual flood effect is
plotted as a comparison against the base category (no flooding) in Figure 6, and the mean
effects are tabulated in Table 7. We observe an upward-trending curve for effects when
setting each covariate at its mean. There is a decrease in the probability of voting with
some flooding, but as the flooding increases, the probability that those voters cast ballots
in the mayoral contest actually increases. The bars around the effects in Figure 6 indicate
the 95% confidence intervals. We also calculate the mean effects for each flood category
against the base case using a matched sample.
Table 7 and Figure 6 Go Here
Our results indicate that flooding did decrease the probability of voting on average.
But we also show that voters who experienced high levels of flooding were more likely to
get to the polls than those with lower levels of flooding. Most important, considering the
claims of potential racial bias that holding the election would cause, controlling for race
and other matched characteristics, voters that experienced the highest levels of flooding
were more likely to turn out than the baseline population (zero feet of flooding). Refer-
ring back to Table 3, note that there is no statistically significant relationship between the
interaction of race and flood depth on the probability of turning out to vote. We do ob-
serve a heterogeneous effect of water depth on the probability of casting a ballot in the
mayoral contest, and this effect follows a upward-shaped pattern. We hypothesize that
this pattern could be consistent with the efforts of a variety of voter mobilization cam-
paigns designed to assist those voters who were most affected by the flooding in casting
a ballot.
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8 Conclusion
This paper presents an optimistic story about mayoral voting after Hurricane Katrina.
Voters whom the media portrayed as having likely higher costs of casting ballots are not
seen here in this analyses to be negatively affected. Although flooding does decrease
the probability that an individual casts a ballot, the relationship between flooding and
race, partisan registration, and age are not key determinants of the likelihood that an
individual casts a ballot. Interestingly, it is not the case that as we increase the depth of
the flooding that this necessarily has a constant effect on the probability that an individual
casts a vote.
By using appropriate modeling techniques, we are able to determine that the effects
of flooding on the likelihood to vote is not linear. Individuals who live in areas that had
large scale flooding were actually more likely to vote in 2006 than others who suffered
less flooding. This finding suggests that, even though the costs associated with coping
with the effects of the flooding for these voters was high, the direct costs of voting were
lowered to the point that these individuals could vote in the election. Given the high
level of interest in the election among interest groups, the candidates, and the media and
the introduction of new voting procedures to minimize the costs of voting, such as vote
centers, expanded absentee voting, and expanded early voting, both the informational
costs of voting and transactional cost of voting were likely reduced. On the informational
dimension, the media, interest groups, the candidates, and election officials in Louisiana
all worked to reach out to displaced voters. The election reforms introduced reduced
the transactional costs of voting. Likewise, the polarized racial dimension also may have
increased the benefits of voting for low-income, African-american voters as well.
This findings distinguish this essay from much of the popular journalism on the im-
pact of Katrina on the election. Rather than necessarily preventing those voters who had
lost so much from participating, instead we observe that for the individuals who had
experienced the worst flooding, they were in fact able to turn out and vote. The key
component in our analysis is that we are able to use both individual data and the most
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rigorous statistical methods to draw our conclusions — the existing work has used ag-
gregate data, and fallen prey to the ecological inference problems. Thus our findings also
emphasize the need for methodological rigor in drawing social science inferences.
Our findings suggest that, in the aftermath of the Katrina disaster, it was possible
to hold elections that were not biased against resource-limited voters. This normative
finding should be comforting to those who were concerned that holding the election so
close to the flooding disaster in New Orleans would systematically discriminate against
the poor and minority voters. Through effective efforts to lower the cost of voting, and
potentially an increase in perceived benefits of participating, the 2006 mayoral election
allowed all voters including those most affected by the flood, to participate and shape the
future recovery.
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10 Appendix
Using the registered voters’ addresses in the voter file, it is also possible to overlay US
Census information. Specifically, we used Census block group information from the U.S.
Census Summary Files 1 and 3. The census block data includes the number of housing
units of rented in the census block, the median household income in the census block and
the number of residents in the census block who are high school graduates. Census blocks
are geographically compact areas which generally contain between 600 and 3000 people,
with an optimum size of 1500 people. This data allows us to control for community effects
which are likely to impact turnout.
In Table 8 we present a summary of all covariates which we include in our analysis.
These variables derive from both the voter file, the USGS flood data, and the U.S. Census.
Table 9 provides descriptive information on flooding levels.
Tables 8 and 9 Go Here
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11 Tables and Figures
Table 1: New Orleans Flood Depth by Registered Voter
Depth (in feet) Number of Individuals Affected May 06 Turnout Percent
0 89,431 38,258 42.78
1 23,751 7,788 32.79
2 34,158 11.640 34.08
3 25,138 8,715 34.67
4 25,437 8,842 34.76
5 16,243 5,740 35.34
6 7,823 3,128 39.98
7 8,060 3,348 41.54
8 7,005 2,972 42.43
9 1,538 730 47.46
10 (or more) 43 18 41.86
Total 238,627 91,179 38.21
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Table 2: Logistic Coefficients, Dependent Variable Vote for Mayor 2006
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Flood Depth -.04* -.02*
(.002) (.002)
Female -.00 .00
(.01) (.01)
Nonwhite -.01 -.02*
(.01) (.01)
Democratic Registration .04* .18*
(.01) (.01)
Voting History 5.30*
(.03)
Age -.001* -.00
(.0003) .00
Constant -2.66* -.52*
(.02) (.02)
N 238,627 238627
Psuedo R2 .21 .0017
* .05 .05
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Table 3: Logistic Coefficients With Interactions and Community Variables, Dependent
Variable Vote for Mayor 2006
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Flood Depth -.03* -.03*
(.01) (.01)
Female .00 .00
(.01) (.01)
Nonwhite -.02 -.03*
(.01) (.01)
Democratic Registration .15* .15*
(.01) (.01)
Age -.00 -.00
(.00) (.00)
Flood Depth * Nonwhite .00 .00
(.00) (.00)
Flood Depth * Democratic Registration .01* .01*
(.004) (.004)
Flood Depth *Age .00 .00
(.00) (.00)
Percent in Blockgroup with a High School Degree .02
(.06)
Percent in Blockgroup of Renter-Occupied Housing Units .02
(.03)
Median Household Income in Blockgroup .00*
(.00)
Constant -.55* -.50*
(.04) (.02)
N 238627 238627
Psuedo R2 .0018 .0017
* = .05, ** = .10
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Table 4: Logistic Coefficients with Ordinal Flood Cutpoints, Dependent Variable Vote for
Mayor May 2006
Variable Coefficient
Flood Depth 1-2 -.40*
(.02)
Flood Depth 2-6 .01
(.02)
Flood Depth 6 .15*
(.03)
Flood Depth 7-9 .06**
(.03)
Flood Depth 9 or More .24*
(.06)
Female .00
(.01)
Nonwhite -.01
(.01)
Democratic Registration .09*
(.01)
Voting History 5.29*
(.03)
Age -.001*
(.0003)
Constant -2.56*
(.02)
N 238,627
Psuedo R2 .21
* .05
36
Ta
bl
e
5:
C
ov
ar
ia
te
M
ea
ns
:U
nm
at
ch
ed
Sa
m
pl
es
Fl
oo
d
D
ep
th
(i
n
fe
et
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
+
Fe
m
al
e
.5
6
.5
7
.5
7
.5
7
.5
6
.5
7
.5
7
.5
5
.5
6
.5
6
.5
8
N
on
w
hi
te
.6
5
.6
6
.6
7
.6
7
.6
7
.6
6
.6
6
.6
5
.6
6
.6
5
.7
9
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
R
eg
.
.5
9
.6
9
.7
3
.7
7
.7
5
.7
5
.6
7
.6
4
.6
2
.5
8
.5
8
Vo
te
H
is
to
ry
.4
0
.3
7
.3
8
.3
9
.3
9
.3
9
.4
2
.4
3
.4
3
.4
4
.4
2
A
ge
46
.4
8
46
.3
0
46
.3
1
46
.3
3
46
.4
1
46
.2
2
46
.2
3
46
.5
1
46
.1
9
45
.9
1
.4
6.
67
Pe
rc
en
tH
S
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
3
.2
5
G
ra
d
(B
lk
gr
p)
Pe
rc
en
tR
en
te
r
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
2
.5
0
O
cc
up
ie
d
(B
lk
gr
p)
M
ed
ia
n
H
ou
se
ho
ld
32
,4
32
32
,0
06
32
,1
10
32
,0
50
31
,9
62
32
,0
95
32
,3
87
46
.5
2
31
,8
60
32
,1
01
30
,3
08
In
co
m
e
(B
lk
gr
p)
37
Ta
bl
e
6:
Q
ua
lit
y
of
M
at
ch
:P
er
ce
nt
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
ep
th
,1
ft
vs
0
ft
2
ft
3
ft
4
ft
5
ft
6
ft
7
ft
8
ft
9
ft
10
ft
Fe
m
al
e
64
.8
0
75
.0
8
63
.1
8
71
.0
6
81
.1
5
71
.7
9
36
.3
8
75
.2
0
31
.5
1
97
.6
9
N
on
w
hi
te
76
.0
2
88
.4
8
63
.3
0
60
.4
7
71
.1
1
84
.7
5
85
.9
9
81
.4
8
30
.0
5
87
.8
2
A
ge
81
.9
9
82
.2
6
62
.2
6
54
.3
8
68
.1
5
79
.5
1
50
.1
7
68
.6
9
44
.0
1
24
.0
1
D
em
98
.3
1
94
.9
6
90
.2
6
90
.4
2
90
.1
1
99
.2
5
84
.0
0
98
.9
3
-6
5.
53
57
.4
9
Vo
te
H
is
to
ry
84
.0
3
93
.7
7
72
.7
6
58
.2
8
56
.1
3
99
.8
3
78
.3
1
95
.1
1
96
.5
6
94
.7
7
Pe
rc
en
tH
S
G
ra
d
73
.8
6
87
.7
5
55
.8
8
51
.9
4
-1
35
.1
3
75
.2
3
82
.1
5
73
.7
3
73
.3
0
96
.1
5
M
ed
ia
n
H
H
In
c
69
.5
2
87
.2
8
62
.2
7
60
.0
9
64
.1
3
49
.7
2
59
.1
0
84
.2
1
58
.8
4
96
.6
3
Pe
rc
en
tR
en
tO
cc
up
ie
d
74
.2
5
84
.7
1
40
.9
5
70
.2
4
71
.0
7
47
.9
2
30
.9
1
82
.6
5
52
.5
2
91
.5
7
38
Table 7: Average Treatment Effect: Probabilities of Voting in May 2006 Mayoral Contest,
Matched Sample
Water Depth Comparison Probability of Voting
Pr(Vote — 1 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4031
Pr(Vote — 2 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .409
Pr(Vote — 3 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4101
Pr(Vote — 4 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4061
Pr(Vote — 5 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4127
Pr(Vote — 6 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4605
Pr(Vote — 7 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4723
Pr(Vote — 8 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .4808
Pr(Vote — 9 ft) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .5341
Pr(Vote — 10 ft or More) - Pr(Vote — 0 ft) .515
Note: All control variables held at their mean values
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Table 8: Summary of Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Female .56 .50 0 1
Nonwhite .66 .47 0 1
Democratic Registration .67 .47 0 1
Vote History .39 .25 0 1
Age 46.37 17.93 18 100
Percent (Blockgroup) High School Degree .24 .09 .02 .54
Percent (Blockgroup) Renter Occupied Housing .52 .24 .02 1
Median (Blockgroup) Household Income 32,306 20,496 10,000 126,071
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Table 9: Zipcodes with High Flooding and Greater Than 50% Black
Zipcode Total High Flooding (more than 5 feet) if Pop of More than 50% Black
70112 2,772 10.17316017 9.941520468
70113 6,220 10.88424437 10.9751835
70114 15,602 10.33200872 10.38435088
70115 24,926 10.01364038 10.3909618
70116 10,000 9.76 10.082397
70117 30,970 10.25185664 10.2310231
70118 25,123 10.31723918 10.32839377
70119 25,614 10.64652143 10.540064
70122 29,925 10.31244779 10.22421963
70124 16,055 10.31454376 0
70125 14,742 9.917243251 9.745244187
70126 16,187 9.791808241 9.861997136
70130 9,836 10.0650671 10.35130565
70131 10,411 10.8058784 10.74766355
70148 241 11.61825726 0
70170 3 0 0
Totals 238,627
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Figure 1: Flood Depth in New Orleans
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Figure 2: April and May 2006 Mayoral Turnout by Flood Depth
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Figure 3: QQ Plots, Matched vs Unmatched Sample
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Figure 4: QQ Plots, Matched vs Unmatched Sample
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Figure 5: QQ Plots, Matched vs Unmatched Sample
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Figure 6: Matched ATE
Matched Average Treatment Effects of Flooding 
on Probability of Vote, Comparisons of No 
Flooding Against Each Flooding Category
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